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by Hiroshi Naka
O n 11 November 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto instructed the Finance and Justice Ministers to 'reform the Japanese financial system 
fundamentally and make the Japanese market free, fair and 
global.' It was then that the Japanese financial Big Bang, named 
after London's 1986 Big Bang, began.
From 1 April 1998, the new Foreign Exchange Control Law 
was enacted. Almost all restrictions dividing the domestic
o
financial market from the overseas market were abolished. Japan 
forced herself into the position where a huge amount of capital 
will inevitably leave Japan and her financial market will be 
hollowed out unless reform is accomplished rapidly. This new 
law was a 'down-payment' to foreign financial institutions 
disappointed at past promises of liberalisation.
Many instances are now being seen of full-scale entry into the 
Japanese market by foreign financial institutions, for example:
  a tie-up between Bankers Trust and The Nippon Credit Bank;
  joint establishment of a new life insurance company by GE 
Capital and Toho Mutual Life;
  entry into the retail securities business by Merrill Lynch 
through taking on 2,000 employees of the failed Yamaichi; and
  an alliance between Travellers Group and Nikko Securities.
These foreign financial institutions are aiming to penetrate 
businesses such as the management of ¥1,200 trillion of financial 
assets held by Japanese individuals and areas such as investment 
banking.
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Japanese financial institutions must survive the positive 
consequence of greater competition while overcoming the other 
more negative result of the financial crisis caused by the serious 
asset problem following the burst of the bubble in the early 
1990s. In mid-1998 an alliance between The Industrial Bank of 
Japan and Nomura Securities was announced. This was the first 
case of an alliance among major Japanese financial institutions 
and this particular combination was beyond expectations. It 
showed that the great competition had already commenced.
A significant change has occurred in the regulatory system as 
well. On 22 June 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency' (FSA) 
was established as a supervisory authority independent from the 
Ministry of Finance. In addition, the Financial System Reform Bill 
was passed by the Diet on 5 June 1998. Many of the measures 
planned were in this bill but, of course, not everything was 
included. Further measures will follow to complete the Big Bang 
process by March 2001. For Japan, the term 'Big Bang' now means 
not only financial system reform but extends also to social reform.
This article examines the whole picture ol the Japanese Big 
Bang from three perspectives:
  What pressures induced this explosion?
  Are the detonations disorderly without any law?
  How will it change the Japanese social system?
THE THREE PRESSURES
To begin with, an analysis is required ol what sort of pressure 
induced this Big Bang. At the very beginning of the universe the 
Big Bang is said to have resulted from gravity concentrating on a 
point that could not endure its huge weight and extremely high 
pressure. In the context ol the Japanese financial system, what 
pressure is equivalent to gravity? Three kinds are to be found.
The story goes back not 15 billion years but to about 50 years 
ago. At that time Japan needed to recover as quickly as possible 
from the damage of World War II. A new financial architecture
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was designed, as well as a strategy to allocate the low level of 
savings efficiently to target industries. Thus the Japanese 
financial system, characterised as business segmentation with 
interest rate regulation, was established. In this system, indirect 
finance is the major means of financing, with direct financing as 
a supplemental means. Short-term credit for corporate 
operation is supplied by commercial banks such as large city 
banks and regional banks. Long-term credit for corporate 
investment is supplied by long-term credit banks, trust banks 
and life insurance companies. Business in the capital market is 
left to securities companies. For a long time this financial system 
functioned very well and supported the high economic growth 
rate through the efficient allocation of savings.
The first pressure
After the two oil shocks of the 1970s, however, Japanese 
economic growth rates stabilised, with lower figures, and the 
direction of the flow of funds changed dramatically. The large 
funds accumulated by the high savings rate flowed less into 
private sector investment and much more into the government 
bond market to finance the mounting budget deficit. Large 
Japanese corporations slowly acquired the capability to raise 
funds directly from the capital market, so that disintermediation 
(the gradual decrease of the acquisition of finance/funds through 
intermediaries) gradually progressed. Under such circumstances 
the financial system, with its segmented financial sectors, 
showed an inability to allocate funds efficiently. This became the 
first pressure to induce the Big Bang.
In response to this pressure, in 1992 a partial review was 
carried out and cross-entry among banking, trust and securities 
businesses through subsidiaries was allowed. It had become 
obvious that a financial system characterised by segmented 
businesses required lots of regulations to designate boundaries 
between businesses, thus reducing the possibilities for free 
market activity by financial institutions.
The second pressure
While Japanese financial institutions have been tied up in 
complicated regulations and competing for enlargement of 
business volume with other Japanese institutions in the same 
sector, the world financial industry has been introducing various 
advanced financial technologies and improving business quality
dramatically. The Japanese financial industry has been left 
behind in the rapid development of financial innovation and has 
gradually lost its international competitiveness. The status of the 
Tokyo market as an international financial centre has also 
declined. There is real concern among policy-makers and people 
working in the financial sector over the hollowing out of the 
Tokyo market and the ability to create jobs by the Japanese 
financial industry. This became the second pressure.
The third pressure
The third pressure comes from the rapidly ageing Japanese 
population, the growth of which is unprecedented in human 
history. A demographic survey shows that, in the Japan of 2025, 
one pensioner over 65 years old will be supported by only two 
workers. In order to support its old people Japan must ensure 
that the ¥1,200 trillion of financial assets held by individuals is 
invested wisely, but more profitably, through public and private 
pension schemes and saving plans. However, its interest rate has 
hit an historic low of almost 1%, lower than the previous record 
of bond yields of Genoa in the 17th century. In the US, the 
financial revolution of the 1970s was a result of high inflation. In 
Japan today, the ageing population and historically low interest 
rate strongly demand financial revolution.
These three pressures have been building up during the first 
half of this decade. A critical point was reached in November 
f 996, and at that time Prime Minister Hashimoto judged that it 
was impossible to ease these hugely accumulated pressures by 
gradual deregulation and decided to release the pressure in the 
form of a Big Bang.
THE WAY AHEAD: REFORM OF FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS
Did Big Bang at the beginning of the universe occur in a
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disorderly way? No   it followed the laws of physics. Will the 
Japanese Big Ba'ng simply destroy the existing financial 
regulations and system? Again, the answer is no. There are laws 
or principles to be followed.
Deregulation
Firstly there is the principle of the promotion of competition 
in financial services by radical deregulation. As has been said, 
many regulations were necessary to sustain the framework of the 
segmented financial system and to keep the system sound, but 
these regulations had become obstacles to competition. Now 
there is a need to make Tokyo an advanced financial centre like 
London and New York. Japan's financial industry must provide 
its ageing society with the best possible quality- of asset 
management services. The Japanese financial system must be 
made as efficient as possible in terms of the transfer mechanisms 
of flows of funds. To achieve these goals there is also a need to 
deregulate dramatically and promote greater competition among 
the financial service providers. Severe competition will 
encourage innovation and a higher quality of financial services.
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The Japanese often talk of the 'Wimbledon effect' on the City 
of London after the British Big Bang. Just as the traditionally 
British Wimbledon tournament has, for many years, been 
dominated by non-British players, so foreigners have come to 
own former British institutions. In Britain there is little bad 
feeling about such developments, but in Japan people do still feel 
a certain sentimentality. This has to be overcome: and will be.
The promotion of freer competition means that the Japanese 
financial system will function on the basis of the market 
mechanism. The former system, with separated business sectors, 
was a system that was suitable for allocating funds to certain 
target industries. But radical deregulation   one of the principles 
of Big Bang   is aiming at a total change in the characteristics of 
the Japanese financial system.
Briefly, I would like to point out some areas of progress. There 
have been radical changes in the financial environment, for 
example in investment trusts, financial derivatives, securitisation 
of real estate, business scope of securities companies, 
liberalisation of prices, tax reform and competition between 
exchanges.
To take just one of these areas, all obstacles concerning 
financial derivative products have been removed. There had 
been legal ambiguities concerning financial derivatives: in the 
case of contracts tor differences, which means that settlement of 
contracts is carried out without any delivery of related property', 
they could possibly have been regarded as a form of gambling 
prohibited under the Criminal Code. The condition for a certain 
type of transaction to be exempt from the application of this 
gambling clause is that it must be authorised by a law other than 
the Criminal Code. Although all types of contracts for 
differences traded in the exchanges were already authorised in 
related laws, most types of over-the-counter contracts for 
differences were not. Therefore such OTC derivatives, including
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forwards, swaps and options, have been defined in a very 
comprehensive way in the Banking Law, the Financial Futures 
Transaction Law and the Securities and Exchanges Law, etc. 
Banks, broker-dealers of financial futures, securities companies, 
etc., have been authorised to do business in these. On the other 
hand, contracts for differences without any such authorised 
financial intermediaries as either party' are probably illegal.
The segmented financial system   the biggest issue of
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deregulation   will be substantially modified simply by every 
type of financial institution acquiring the ability to provide 
similar financial products and services through radical 
deregulation, and liberalisation of products in particular. The 
barriers which had institutionally segmented the business sectors 
will be lowered by allowing cross-entry through subsidiaries and
J O -' O
by the utilisation of the recently introduced financial holding 
company system. The financial holding company will be the best 
tool for pursuing economies of scale or scope through mergers 
and acquisitions, restructuring businesses by outsourcing 
business to a subsidiary or selling a non-profitable business. The 
map of the Japanese financial industry will change quickly after 
the Big Bang. Several gigantic conglomerates, many financial 
boutiques, and other financial institutions of diverse character 
can be expected to take their places on that map.
Reregulation
The second principle of Big Bang is 'reregulation'. In a sense, 
reregulation contradicts deregulation. But it is necessary in the 
Big Bang process to study what means of public intervention in 
the financial industry can be justified and to review regulations 
in consequence. In this sense Big Bang is reregulation as well as 
deregulation and they are not contrary to one other. What are 
the reasons behind public intervention in the financial industry? 
There are three areas of legal interest to be protected. First, 29
avoidance of systemic problems arising in the financial system; 
secondly, protection of consumers such as depositors, investors 
and policyholders and, thirdly, maintenance of fair trade. These 
three interests have long been recognised in Japan just as in 
other industrialised nations. They will not be changed by Big 
Bang, although public intervention will, however, be executed 
using different methods.
In what direction are these methods to be changed? First, the 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) trusts market discipline 
and requires consumers to take more responsibility for their 
decisions. Secondly, if there is any sort of fault or failure found 
in the financial market, the authority promptly and transparently 
deals with the case according to pre-set and pre-announced 
rules. In other words, Japanese regulators and supervisors will 
transform the methods of administration from handling issues in 
advance, with room for discretion, to ex post facto handling of 
issues based on pre-set rules, from industry-oriented to market- 
oriented, and from domestic to global standards.
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Formerly, systemic problems had been avoided and consumer 
protection ensured by allowing excess profit in each financial 
sector while imposing minute and detailed restrictions on the 
activities of financial institutions. In this way the authority 
ensured the sound operation of each institution. More precisely, 
maintaining the balance between various business sectors and 
between the financial institutions within each sector was seen as 
vital for financial stability; this balance warranted detailed 
restrictions and guidance, using the authority's business 
boundary-drawing power. In the case of failure of an institution 
in a certain business area, the authority planned a rescue merger 
of the institution by another strong institution in the same 
business area under the so-called 'convoy system'.
As to financial administration and supervision, the biggest 
change is the reorganisation of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
The MOF had the dual functions of planning and supervision 
relating to the Japanese financial system. On 22 June 1998, 
however, the supervisory function was transferred to the FSA, a 
newly established agency of 403 staff members, which is under
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the Prime Minister's office and independent of the MOF. The 
non-ministerial Commissioner of the FSA is a former public 
prosecutor, Mr Hino. The planning function has been left in a 
new bureau of the MOF, the Financial System Planning Bureau 
(FPB), integrating the banking and securities bureaux. The 
prevailing view is that this reorganisation is political. It is said 
that the reorganisation was the result of one of the reviews of the 
role of the Japanese bureaucracy and aims to weaken the MOF, 
the 'ministry of ministries', by partially depriving it of authority. 
It is also said that it was as a penalty for failure to maintain 
financial system stability that the ministry lost authority over 
supervision and inspection.
When the Big Bang process is completed in 2001, the MOF 
will be reorganised again as part of an overall organisational 
reform of the Japanese 'Whitehall'. It will lose almost all of its 
financial system planning function and will probably be renamed 
the 'Treasury'. The only function left in this Treasury will be that 
related to financial crisis management. Meanwhile the FSA will 
have full authority over the financial system and will be headed 
by a minister with full responsibility for financial stability. How 
do we interpret this reorganisation? Why will financial crisis
management be shared? This is probably because the Treasury is 
expected to be a kind of watchdog over the FSA. Supervisors 
tend to use forbearance when faced with the symptoms of a 
financial crisis because it is very hard for them to admit their 
supervisory failure. So a kind of watchdog is needed. In the UK, 
HM Treasury shares responsibility over systemic risk with the 
Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England based on 
a Memorandum of Understanding. However, in reality it is 
perhaps fair to say that the Treasury is expected to be such a 
watchdog.
Changes in supervisory methods
What changes will be seen in supervisory methods? The most 
important is the introduction of PCA (prompt corrective 
action). The idea of PCA comes from the US. Supervisors order 
a bank to take pre-set corrective actions when its financial 
situation deteriorates to a certain stage. Such levels of financial 
condition are judged by objective measures such as the capital 
adequacy ratio. At the worst stage of excess liabilities the bank 
will be ordered to suspend its business. PCA, therefore, is an 
early cure, the need for which is judged by an objective medical 
check. In order to know the accurate capital adequacy ratio, a 
bank itself must assess the value of its assets and then certified 
public accountants (CPAs) and FSA bank inspectors examine 
that self-assessment. A similar idea is to be introduced for 
insurance and securities companies. On-site inspection will be 
improved, with inspectors placing more importance on internal 
risk control systems as well as the quality of assets. Supervisors 
will be tougher in using legal measures against financial 
institutions if they find something that needs to be improved.
A more transparent process of financial system planning will 
be seen. The FPB will publish a consultation paper to collect 
public comments when they decide on significant rule changes. 
Under the industry-oriented regime, comments were collected 
only from industrial associations like that of the Federation of 
Bankers; there is now a requirement to invite comments from 
various foreign financial institutions, Japanese consumers and 
others.
The role played by the Bank of Japan in maintaining financial 
stability has been clear. The new Bank of Japan Law, enacted 
from April 1998, reveals that one of the bank's purposes is to 
operate the clearing and settlement system and maintain its 
stability It also has powers to supply liquidity without collateral 
in the case of an institutional emergency, like a computer system 
crash, and to supply liquidity with special terms in case of 
systemic problems arising from failure of a financial institution. 
This special lending is executed on acceptance of a request from 
the Finance Minister, based on consultation with the FSA 
Commissioner. In addition, the examination of financial 
institutions, which had legal ambiguity under the previous Bank 
of Japan Law, has been authorised for the first time as a means 
for the bank to maintain the stability of the clearing and 
settlement system. Although it has no authority of supervision 
over each financial institution, the bank is expected to share a 
certain responsibility for the stability of the clearing and 
settlement system, which is to say, the financial system.
CONSUMER PROTECTION
The second area of legal interest is that of consumer 
protection. The framework for the protection of consumers
such as depositors, investors, and policyholders has been 
strengthened with the viewpoint that consumers should take 
more responsibility for their decisions. However, in order for 
consumers to make responsible judgments, it is important to 
provide proper information on financial institutions and 
products. Requirements for banks' disclosure to depositors have 
therefore been strengthened and this previously voluntary 
disclosure has been made a legal obligation under the Banking
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Law. Managers or employees of a bank who fail to disclose or 
commit false disclosure of items such as the amount of bad loans 
can be individually penalised and the bank itself will be 
sanctioned. Securities companies and insurance companies are 
subject to similar obligations. Regarding the disclosure of bad 
loans, the definition used by the major money-centre banks, as 
from the financial year ended March 1998, is now compatible 
with global standards (if American SEC standards can be called 
global).
Another issue of disclosure relating to the issuance of 
securities and so on will also make much progress. The rules will 
be amended to require consolidated disclosure covering both 
parent and subsidiary companies. Accounting standards for 
research and development will be equivalent to global standards. 
What is being discussed now includes the expansion from 
financial institutions to companies in general of utilisation of the 
mark-to-market method of evaluating financial instruments. 
Recently the accountancv office for the failed Yamaichi 
Securities faced a lawsuit brought bv shareholders on the
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grounds that the office missed the huge amount of loss
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concealed off balance sheet. It is likely that this kind of legal trial 
will improve the quality' of audits by CPAs
One more comment on disclosure. Financial institutions have 
been required to explain schemes fully to consumers, including 
the potential risks of financial products, at point of sale. In Japan 
there are many cases of the mis-selling of life-insurance 
products with no guarantee for principal. These products were 
sold by insurance companies, with the co-operating banks' 
backing finance, to those who wanted tax plans to cope with the 
heavy inheritance tax duty' resulting from the asset bubble. Some 
insurance companies and banks have been criticised for not fully 
explaining the risks implied in the products and the tax plans.
DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
ENHANCED
The dispute-settlement system for problems between 
securities companies and their customers has been enhanced. 
Previously, customers could ask the MOF to mediate on their 
behalf with the securities companies concerned. To achieve a 
more effective and easier to use dispute settlement system, a 
new system has been introduced, whereby customers can ask a 
committee, members of which are selected from outside of the 
securities industry by the Securities Dealers Association, a self- 
regulatory organisation, to arbitrate. The securities companies 
concerned must obey the arbitration unless they file the case in 
court. As yet, there is no such dispute-settlement system in the 
banking and insurance sectors. This is a future task which may 
benefit from a study of the UK's experience, where the dispute- 
settlement system is to be transferred from self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs) to the Financial Services Authority- (FSA).
With very strong competition brought about by radical 
deregulation and greater reliance on market discipline, failures
of banks and other financial institutions are inevitable. If the 
principle of consumer self-responsibility is fully applied, 
consumers have to accept 100% of their losses. However, 
because consumers are not always given full information, both at 
the point of sale and afterwards, it is unfair to ask them to carry 
100% of their losses. The authority has to enhance consumer 
protection measures to prepare for failures of financial 
institutions.
Bank deposits are protected by the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, which guarantees up to ¥10m to each depositor 
and gives financial assistance to a bank which rescues a failed 
bank by merger or acquisition. This is why Japan has also 
strengthened safety nets for investors and policyholders.
As for investor protection, the Securities Investor Protection 
Fund   a public institution   has been established under the 
Securities and Exchange Law. Securities companies are obliged 
to join the new Fund. The ceiling on compensation to any one 
customer is expected to be ¥10m, with the definition of 
customers to be protected excluding professional investors, such 
as institutional investors. In addition, special provisions have 
been provided to permit the fund to act as a proxy for customers 
in bankruptcy or reorganisation procedures for securities 
companies, as with banks. Legal obligations have also been set 
for customer assets to be managed separately from company 
assets, in order to protect investors in the event of a securities 
company failure. If this separation works well, the financial 
burden on the fund will be lighter.
The Policyholder Protection Corporation has been created to 
replace the Policyholder Protection Fund, which protected 
policyholders by providing financial assistance to the relief 
insurance company, which helped a failed insurance company by 
taking on its portfolio. The corporation has been given the new 
function of accepting the portfolio of a failed insurance 
company should no relief insurance company come forward. 
When the corporation takes on portfolios directly, it can cut the 
dividend rates promised by the failed insurer. The corporation 
guarantees the insurance payments up to 90% of the technical 
reserves which should have been held for future insurance 
payments by the failed insurer.
In order to avoid moral hazard, these safety nets do not always 
guarantee 100% of the claims held by depositors, investors, or 
policyholders. In some cases, consumers have to take 
responsibility for their own choices. However, until the end of 
March 2001 when the Big Bang process is complete, deposits, 
securities in custody, and insurance policies will be 100% 
protected because this period is seen as the transition period for 
meeting the preconditions of the principle of self-responsibility 
The Deposit Insurance Corporation already has ¥17 trillion of 
special funds available to use in this period and backed by the 
Government. The Securities Investor Protection Fund and the 
Policyholders Protection Corporation will also have access to 
sufficient funds over this period, backed by the Government.
FAIR TRADE
Prevention of unfair trading in which financial intermediaries 
were involved had been ensured by giving directions to such 
intermediaries, not by legislation. A license was required to 
establish a securities company, and it was thought that a licensed 
institution could be appropriately directed by the MOF. Legal 31
rules therefore were not alwavs seen as necessary and 
administrative guidance was enough. For example, in the scandal 
of 1991, the covering of investors' losses by securities companies 
was not illegal because it was not prohibited by law. However, 
there was an administrative guidance prohibiting such action.
Therefore, as the liberalisation of the securities market moves 
ahead, it must be ensured that markets are fair and trustworthy, 
and that investors are able to trade in them with confidence. Fair 
trading rules have been formulated and enhanced to prevent 
unfair trading activities, the spreading of rumours, market 
manipulation and insider trading as the markets adapt to the 
introduction of OTC derivatives on securities and so on. This 
includes forfeiture of illicit profits by unfair trading practices 
such as insider trading. Many measures to prevent conflict of 
interest have also been introduced in the Securities and 
Exchange Law. Conflict of interest is nothing new. In the 1992 
financial system reform, conflict of interests between banks and 
their securities subsidiaries was one of the main topics and 
various firewalls were built. Now, since one financial body can 
operate more and more businesses simultaneously, this issue has 
become even bigger. Although tough competition itself could be 
a pressure preventing conflicts of interest in a company, it 
appears that the authority needs to deal carefully with this issue.
Money-laundering is also an important issue, especially as the 
financial market is integrated in the global market. In the 
amendment to the Foreign Exchange Control Law, the
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procedure of export and import of cash or securities 
denominated in yen or foreign currency of more than Y¥ 1 m was 
tightened and money-changers were required to identify' 
customers in exchanges of more than ¥5m. International 
transfers of funds exceeding ¥2m must be reported by banks to 
tax offices. The FSA also established the post of Administrator 
for Financial Intelligence Management. The administrator is in 
charge of collecting, processing, analysing, and providing 
information on suspicious transactions to relevant investigatory 
agencies.
FURTHER READING
See Issue 6 (April 1998), p. 7, for comment on the Japanese Big 
Bang by Hiroshi Goto, and Issue 7 (May 1998), p. 31, for an 
article by Koji Takahashi on shareholders' derivative actions.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
Finally, a brief explanation of social change which, whilst not 
exactly a principle, is an inescapable consequence of Big Bang. 
The explanation focuses on the impact of Big Bang on three 
relationships:
  those between corporations and their shareholders;
  their employees; and
  with other companies.
In this regard, the enhancement of corporate governance must 
first be underlined. Shareholders in Japan have long been 
accustomed to low rates of income gains. This is perhaps partly 
because income gains were much lower than capital gains during 
the two decades of rapid economic growth. It may also have to 
do with the attitude of the management of Japanese companies 
toward shareholder meetings; they needed silent shareholders 
and therefore increased cross-shareholdings. But times have
changed and shareholders have become gradually more vocal in 
their criticism. There have been many cases of shareholders 
filing lawsuits against directors who have damaged their
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companies, taking advantage of streamlined procedures for such 
lawsuits. Some foreign shareholders have demanded more from 
management. Under these circumstances many Japanese 
managers have emphasised the need to improve indicators such 
as returns on equity which, although familiar elsewhere, has in 
Japan only recently become common. However, even if the 
Japanese government reforms the capital market, it cannot be 
attractive to investors without good corporate governance.
Changes will also be seen in the relationship between 
corporations and their employees. Like financial institutions in 
Wall Street, Japanese financial institutions will have to pay more 
than 'bar' or $lm bonuses to specialists such as financial 
engineers. Even in Japan headhunting in the financial industry 
has been acknowledged as a 'daytime' job. Nowadays 
headhunters are said to receive almost the same number of 
requests from Japanese as from foreign financial institutions 
operating in Japan. It does not seem necessary to abandon the 
lifetime employment system in all Japanese companies, but it is 
essential for Japanese financial institutions doing wholesale 
business to employ more highly skilled workers from a more 
flexible labour market. Unless they do so, Japan will see the 
hollowing-out of its excellent human resources and Big Bang will 
not succeed.
We will also see changes in the relationships between 
companies. Business depending overly on long-term relations 
between companies will gradually disappear. In particular, the 
main bank system, which has supported associated corporations 
as a lender of last resort, will be modified. The status of semi- 
main banks at least can be expected to totally disappear totally, 
and the main banks will not be able to get involved in every 
business offer from associated corporations just because of their 
status as main banks. Although it does not seem desirable too
throw away long-term business relationships, it appears 
favourable to see full competition in quality of service without 
over-reliance on long-term relationships.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the Big Bang provided a reminder of one of the 
main lessons from the East Asian currency crisis: that the 
financial system in any country is inevitably affected by the 
advanced financial centres in this globalised financial world. The 
Japanese Big Bang seems to be difficult for Japan to implement 
because it breaks all the established orders. But from the global 
perspective it is just a matter of course, so it simply has to be 
implemented.
In the final stage of the Japanese Big Bang process, a financial 
services law that integrates Banking Law, Securities and
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Exchange Law, Insurance Law and so on will probablv be 
needed. Will reference be made again to the UK model? ™
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